

# **The Harriman Institute Forum**

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AND THE REFORMULATION  
OF THE SOVIET PAST**

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## The Stalin Debate and the Reformulation of the Soviet Past

Mark von Hagen

It comes as no surprise that a major reform movement that has affected all aspects of economic, social, political, and cultural life should have also provoked a fundamental reconsideration of the national past(s). Indeed, the years since 1985 have been accompanied by impassioned discussions of the national heritage, the character and origins of the current systemic crisis, the search for alternative models in the past that would point to a better future social order, and the settling of old blood feuds among national and ethnic groups. Institutional struggles have been waged in important symbolic arenas through the tactics of historical revisionism, on the one hand, and through defense of relatively more orthodox views of the past, on the other. Other observers have focused on earlier periods and written more detailed chronologies of events;<sup>1</sup> I shall discuss the contexts of the debate among the historians, then the newly emerging challenges to the long-reigning orthodox historical narratives, and finally focus on some specific "hot points" in the discussions. Because much of what can be observed today in the former Soviet Union

parallels the stages of the rewriting of the postwar German past, I will highlight some of the important differences and similarities in the Soviet and German settings. The interplay of German politics and national history reached a new level of intensity in the recent *Historikerstreit*, a pitched intellectual battle between conservative and left-centrist writers.<sup>2</sup>

### The Contexts of the Discussion

The professional Soviet historical community has been, of course, an important—although, as will be clear below, not necessarily the most important—context for the struggles over defining and interpreting the national past. Professional historians were concentrated in the numerous and large research institutes that were situated primarily under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences, Sector for Historical Sciences, to a lesser degree in pedagogical institutes and university history departments, and, importantly, those institutes previously under the patronage of the Central Committee of the Com-

- 1 See the excellent account by R. W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989); also William B. Husband, ed., "Glasnost' and Soviet Historians," *Soviet Studies in History* 27, no. 1 (Summer 1988); *Soviet Studies in History*, ed. Donald Raleigh; Walter Laqueur, *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991); John Keep, "Reconstructing Soviet History: A New 'Great Turn'?" *Studies in Soviet Thought* 38, no. 2 (1989): 117-45.
- 2 See Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988); and Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London: Edward Arnold, 1985).



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munist Party and Ministry of Defense. Partly because the institutional setting of much history writing has been closely affiliated with powerful establishment interests, professional historians were slow to respond to the appeals for "new thinking" about the past.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, when compared to German historians, who now have the advantage of a nearly fifty-year perspective since the Allies defeated the Third Reich and thereby forced a radical break with the Nazi past, historians of the Soviet past have a morally more "messy" situation, because radical change was introduced from within the system and not forced from outside. The limited de-Stalinization that occurred during the Khrushchev period can hardly compare with the de-Nazification of German political and intellectual life, however many compromises might have qualified that latter process.<sup>4</sup>

Because the professional historians' community was so closely linked to the hegemonic ideology of Stalinist Marxism and because Glavlit exercised severe censorship constraints over all historical writing, the public reputation of Soviet historians was extremely low. This has been especially true for twentieth-century history and political history, where the historians of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held ideological sway. Party historians worked in perhaps the most constrained environments; consequently, their writing characteristically was the least imaginative and most tendentious.<sup>5</sup> Finally, Soviet historians who wrote about their own country's twentieth-century past suffered from virtual intellectual isolation from the international community, in that they rarely knew foreign languages; as a result, major works by non-Soviet historians were accessible only in the hostile accounts of them under the rubrics of "the fight against bourgeois falsifiers." Therefore, debate among Soviet historians was limited to those occasions when power struggles temporarily opened up political space for alternative approaches and did not reflect any of the often passionate discussions outside the Soviet Union. The consequence of these contextual factors has

been that, even as Soviet historians gained unprecedented access to their national and regional archives and freedom to investigate new themes and periods, they typically limited their efforts to filling in "blank spots," that is, to correcting accounts of the past that were blatantly falsified or chronicling previously ignored episodes. They have been far less forthcoming with new conceptual models to explain the larger dilemmas of the Soviet period and their relationship to the longer *durée* of Russian Imperial history.

As a consequence of the nearly universal disdain in which Soviet historians have been held and the related intellectual vacuum in the academic institutes, other actors on the contemporary scene stepped in to challenge the discredited professionals. From the beginning, fictional literature played and continues to play an important role in setting the terms of the discussion. In Russian intellectual history, fictional literature traditionally has been the arena for the most important moral and philosophical struggles; and unlike the Anglo-American tradition, where political philosophy and especially political science for a long time shaped the intellectual environment of Soviet studies, in the contemporary Soviet Union that environment was shaped by writers, filmmakers, playwrights, and an important category of political journalists known as *publitsisty*. Well before the professional historians began grappling with the Stalin question, Tengiz Abuladze's film *Repentance* (*Pokayaniye*), Mikhail Shatrov's plays, and Anatoly Rybakov's novel *Children of the Arbat* (*Deti Arbata*) provoked impassioned polemics in the national media. And the influence of fiction extends well beyond living writers and filmmakers; the posthumous publication of previously banned works by Soviet writers often has played an even more critical role than those of living ones in reshaping and reorienting historical discussions among intellectuals and the greater Soviet reading public.

Closely related to the cultural intelligentsia's largely metahistorical reflections are the diverse

3 Here I have in mind the central and republican Institutes of Marxism-Leninism and Party History, the Institute of Military History, and the central and republican branches of the Academy of Sciences. Perhaps not surprisingly, some of the most sensational "revisionists" were affiliated with an institute that was not subordinated to these powerful institutional interests, namely the Moscow State Historical-Archive Institute (MGIAI, now part of the Russian State Humanities University). The Institute's former director (and the new University rector), Yuri Afanasyev, was in the forefront of the most radical, if not always the most intellectually responsible, rethinking of twentieth-century Russian history.

4 See Albert P. Van Goudoever, *The Limits of De-Stalinization in the Soviet Union* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986).

5 For discussions of the political functions of contemporary history in the Soviet Union and accounts of several key intellectual-political battles, see Nancy Whittier Heer, *Politics and History in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1971); *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, ed. John Keep (New York: Praeger, 1964); Konstantin Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1962); John Barber, *Soviet Historians in Crisis, 1928-1932* (London and Basingstone: The Macmillan Press, 1981).



activities of various civic organizations and so-called "informals" that emerged in the years since 1985 as alternative claimants to political legitimacy against the Communist Party and Soviet state. A key component of these groups' strategy in the political struggle was to construct alternative views of the past; they especially devoted their efforts to restoring the history of Stalin's crimes to national consciousness. The largest and most influential of these societies has been Memorial, which grew out of a network of Brezhnev-era human-rights activists and dissident intellectuals. While Memorial mobilized "democratic" forces on the Soviet "left," still other "informals," here characterized by the Pamyat' society and its intellectual allies, rallied to defend the Russian national reputation from what they charged were the nihilistic attacks of often "cosmopolitan" besmirchers of the heroic past. For Pamyat', too, one's relationship to the past is key to any campaign of national repentance and renewal.

Still other contexts deserve mention to complete the list of shaping influences and limitations of the current debate. As Soviet readers and historians struggled to overcome the well-worn stereotypes and overly simplified historical narratives of the Stalinist *Short Course*, the publication of non-Soviet works offered alternative visions of the national past. In this category are the classics of Anglo-American Sovietology,<sup>6</sup> *tamizdat* and émigré accounts, and previously banned "Soviet" accounts, most importantly the writings of Trotsky, Bukharin, the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, and the books of Roy Medvedev. Not only have these previously proscribed writings contributed to a widening of the intellectual horizons, but very often the authors themselves—one can mention here Stephen Cohen and Roy Medvedev as the most representative of this tendency—entered into the contemporary Soviet political fray.

## The Evolution of the Stalin Debate

The Stalin question dominated all discussions, at least for the first period of post-1985 history. Stalin became a shorthand for all the tortured moral and political dilemmas that the past had laid at the doorstep of the current generations of Soviet citizens. Political figures and intellectuals insisted that the Soviet system had reached a critical impasse that was the consequence of a farreaching comprehensive crisis. The system had to be reformed, or, again in the early shorthand of the reformers, the "command-administrative system" had to be dismantled and in its place must be built a new socialism that promised a reassertion of the "human factor."<sup>7</sup> At this early stage, historical precedents for a socialism more humane than the victorious Stalinist version were most often identified with the moderate policies of NEP and the ideas of Nikolay Bukharin, who advocated a hybrid political economy that would harmonize elements of planning with a regulated market. Bukharin became the "genuine" successor to Lenin's legacy of "revolutionary reformism"; publicists and historians "reinterpreted"—often quite willfully—Lenin's conception of socialism, especially the so-called cooperative plan, in such a way that Lenin could serve the contemporary political agenda.<sup>8</sup> The reformist political leadership reactivated the process of rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, begun under Khrushchev and halted by his successors; this time the defeated members of political oppositions in the 1920s were cleared of all accusations of crime and treason and restored posthumously to Party membership and a place in the historical chronicle. Some feeble voices were heard to defend one or another part of Stalin's heritage, but generally a spirit of consensus reigned as the political leadership, intellectuals, and the articulate public worked in harmony to heal the wounds of Stalin's crimes. In order to save socialism, reformers put all or most of the blame on Stalin and tried to demonstrate that

6 Among the translated works are: Alexander Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*; Stephen Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*; Robert Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary*; Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror*; Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*; and E.H. Carr, *History of Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*.

7 For characteristic examples of Soviet analysis of the Stalin system in this initial period, see economist Gavril Popov's review of the novels of Aleksandr Bek, especially *The New Assignment* (*Novoye naznachenie*), in *Nauka i zhizn'* 4 (1987): 54-65; sociologist L. G. Ionin's review of Abuladze's film *Repentance* in *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* 3 (1987): 62-72.

8 For some interesting observations on the importance of rethinking Lenin, see Markus Wehner, "Auf der Suche nach der 'Wahrheit'? Zum polemischen Streit sowjetischer Historiker und Publizisten ueber die 1920er Jahre und die Urspruenge des Stalinismus," *Osteuropa* 12 (1990): 1129-44; and Lars T. Lih, "NEP: An Alternative for Soviet Socialism," in *The Soviet Union under Gorbachev*, ed. Stephen F. Cohen and Michael Kraus (forthcoming).



Stalinism and socialism were entirely different matters.

But as the search for the roots of the Stalin phenomenon went further and as the monopoly on reform began to slip from the central leadership, that consensus began to erode and sharp political differences to emerge. Beginning in 1988 a self-styled "radical" political alternative had formed to challenge Gorbachev's revolution from above and to demand more rapid democratization and transition to a "market economy." These radical reforms by their nature entailed a rejection of the old model of Soviet socialism, rather than merely a reform within that system. All major existing institutions came under siege in the ensuing political struggles that pitted "establishment" politicians against "popular fronts" and "democratic unions." In place of the Communist Party's monopoly, the radicals proposed multiparty parliamentary democracy and even the dismissal of Communist officials from all state and social institutions. Calls to dismantle the security and police apparatus threatened the status of the KGB; projects to reform the army along the lines of a "professional," volunteer and much reduced force similarly alarmed the career military men and their allies in the industrial-defense bureaucracy. The proffered panacea of privatization and market economy was accompanied by attacks on the planning and economic bureaucracies. And, finally, the swelling movements for national autonomy and, in places, for independence threatened the very fabric of the Union that formally held in place the multiethnic state.

All these challenges pushed the Stalin debate onto different grounds; by 1989 and especially during 1990, the "radicals" had put into question the entire Soviet period and impugned Lenin and Trotsky with no less vigor than their counterparts had attacked Stalin a year before.<sup>9</sup> The "radicals" frequently reduced historical discussions to black-and-white stereotypes; in their calls to repudiate the criminal Soviet period for a kinder and gentler tsarist past, they resembled the Stalinist historians who in their turn had dismissed the pre-1917 Russian

past as dark and benighted in favor of an inspirational post-1917 pageant of proletarian progress. The radicals thereby risked standing charged with the same type of historical nihilism for the Soviet period that they once accused the official historical establishment of perpetrating for earlier periods.

For all the excesses in the recent "radicalization" of the historical discussions, however, a breakthrough has been achieved; the formerly impermeable boundary of 1917 has been overcome; historians now face the far more difficult issues that are tied up with the relationship of the Soviet period to its prerevolutionary antecedents. The intellectual rehabilitations of Trotsky, the Mensheviks, and the religious-social thinker Nikolay Berdyayev have returned contemporary writers to the contradictions of Russia's backwardness and the revolutionary legacy of socialism. Here several positions have emerged, many of them resembling the arguments worked out in painful struggles by generations of non-Soviet historians and Soviet exiles.<sup>10</sup>

Of course, with some important qualifications, the orthodox view that reigned in Soviet historiography until recently posited a fundamental continuity of post-1917 history and a more or less radical discontinuity between pre- and post-1917 history, with the October Revolution as the watershed of Russian, if not world, history. The Party leadership, united and unanimous, steered the Soviet peoples through the challenges of modernization and defended the "achievements of socialism" from domestic and foreign enemies.<sup>11</sup>

The émigré, anti-Soviet version of this narrative preserved the radical caesura of 1917, but reversed the values assigned to the two periods. The anti-Soviet writers argued for an optimistic, if often rose-colored view of prerevolutionary Russia and an unmitigatingly bleak and denunciatory view of post-1917 developments, rarely if ever distinguishing among Bolshevik leaders and viewing Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin as mere faces of the same monster. The exemplar text for this narrative has no doubt been Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's monumental literary-historical investigation, *The Gulag Archipel-*

9 An early article that posed the question of Lenin's responsibility for much of the tragedy of Soviet history was Vasily Selyunin's "Istoki," *Novy mir* 5 (1988): 162-89. Characteristic of the mood during the summer of 1990 was the popularity of a devastating critique of the Soviet system in the film, *Tak zhit' nel'zya* (*We Can't Go On Like That*); the director, Stanislav Govorukhin, in an often sensationalistic narrative, violently distorts the historical record and lays the entire blame for decades of social criminality on Lenin himself.

10 Igor' Khyamkin's article, "Kakaya ulitsa vedet k khramu?" *Novy mir* 11 (1987), was an important precursor for the discussions of pre- and post-1917 history. He sympathetically explored the ideas of conservative and anti-Soviet writers, including Trotsky, the Menshevik Fyodor Dan, and the *Smenovokhoutsy* (Changing Landmarks). Recently, important collections of Russian intellectual thought have appeared, including: *Vekhi* (Signposts, 1909; rpt. Moscow: Novosti, 1990); *Iz glubiny* (De profundis, 1918; rpt. Moscow: Novosti, 1991).

11 Here the exemplar text was Stalin's *Short Course*, first published in 1938, republished in millions of copies.



ago. For the millions of readers of Solzhenitsyn's moral indictment, the gulag became the dominant symbol of the Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens were ruthlessly divided into prison staff and prisoners. This version of the Soviet past has been reinforced both by the translated classics of Cold War Anglo-American Sovietology, such as Conquest's *The Great Terror*, and by the efforts of informal popular historical societies, such as Memorial. For those who propound such views, the moral stakes are high indeed; they have confronted the Soviet peoples with their tragic and criminal past in order to prevent the recurrence of such monumental bloodletting and terror in the future. They aim to commemorate the martyrs of this cruel system and purge the national consciousness of any attachment to the values of the Stalin regime.<sup>12</sup>

Some historians and publicists who reject the Soviet experiment but find the ahistorical approach of the "gulag perspective" unsatisfactory have searched in the pre-1917 period for the origins of Leninism and Stalinism. One variation of this narrative is to identify the roots of the negative Soviet phenomenon in the political culture of the immediate prerevolutionary period. The Harvard historian, Richard Pipes, has written the most articulate version of this devastatingly anti-Russian view of the Russian past.<sup>13</sup> For Pipes, the Bolshevik dictatorship was the natural outcome of the traditions of the tsarist police state and the pre-capitalist peasants of the Russian commune. Pipes' views will hardly appeal to Russian nationalists, but they were taken up by a variety of anti-Russian nationalists in the peripheral republics. Rather more attractive for anti-Bolshevik Russian patriots is the equally determinist argument of Aleksandr Tsipko, who blames the political culture and ideology of the Russian leftist intelligentsia for the terrors of Stalinism. For Tsipko, tsarist society, especially the Russian peasantry, was fundamentally healthy, but for the historical accident of a radically-oriented

revolutionary intelligentsia whose ideas were borrowed from European utopian thinkers, with Marx as only the most pernicious influence.<sup>14</sup> However much Pipes and Tsipko may disagree on, say, the virtues of the Russian peasantry, they nevertheless share a highly moralizing and moralistic approach to history, as well as a common political agenda of authoritarian market capitalism.

Historians and publicists who were troubled by the teleological implications of these overly determinist explanatory schemas responded with a history of "alternatives" to Stalin and Stalinism. Contemporary "alternativists" were generally affiliated with the reformist wing within the Communist Party and retained some loyalty to socialist ideals; they have carried forward a tradition with both Soviet dissident (Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge* and his journal *Politicheskii dnevniki* [Political Diary]) and Western revisionist (here the work of Lewin, Cohen, and Tucker) parallels, as well as sharing some affinity with earlier Trotskyist and Menshevik critiques of Stalinism. The alternativists posit a discontinuity between Leninism and Stalinism and thereby identify a non-Stalinist alternative for Soviet development, usually Bukharinism, less often Trotskyism. The most articulate and persuasive proponents of the Bukharin alternative to Stalin have been *Kommunist* editor Otto Latsis<sup>15</sup> and the historian of collectivization Viktor Danilov.<sup>16</sup> Because both contend that NEP, despite its crises, could and should have developed further, they focus on the end of NEP and the last chances for its defense. Danilov sees that chance not only in Bukharin's opposition to Stalin's murderous turn against the peasantry and toward breakneck industrialization, but also in the spring 1929 variant of the first five-year plan, which, in Danilov's opinion, foresaw moderate and balanced economic growth. Latsis contends that Stalin's radical turn away from NEP found resonance among young workers who were infused with revolutionary impatience, or

12 See the critical analysis of the gulag narrative literature in Gabor Tamas Ritterspoon, *Simplifications staliniennes et complications soviétiques: Tensions sociales et conflits politiques en URSS 1933-53* (Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines, 1988).

13 See his *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1990), translated for publication in the Soviet Union.

14 Tsipko has published extensively in Soviet journals, the first articles, "Istoki stalinizma," appearing in *Nauka i zhizn'* 11-12 (1988) and 1-2 (1989); an English-language summary of his views is available in *Is Stalinism Really Dead?* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); see my review of Tsipko in "The Stalin Question," *The Nation* (March 25, 1991): 382-87. In his ideological determinism, Tsipko often comes close to the views of the Polish exile philosopher Leszek Kolakowski. The "countryside" novelists (*derevenshchiki*), such as Boris Mozhaev in *Muzhiki i bab'i*, and agrarian economist Vladimir Tikhonov actively promote the "pro-peasant" views of Tsipko, who in turn cites their works as evidence for his own writings. See Tikhonov's remarks at a round-table discussion in *Istoriya SSSR* 3 (1989): 20ff.

15 See his "Perelom," *Znaniya* 6 (1988): 124-78; "Stalin protiv Lenina," in *Osmyslit' kul't Stalina* (Moscow: Progress, 1989), pp. 215-46; and *Vyiti iz kvadrata* (Moscow, 1989).

16 For Danilov's views, see "The Issue of Alternatives and History of Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture," *The Journal of Historical Sociology* 2, no.1 (1989); and *Istoriya SSSR* 3 (1989). In addition to his advocacy of the Bukharinist alternative program, Danilov played a key role in the rehabilitations of the agrarian economists Aleksandr Chayanov and Nikolay Kondratyev, as well as Trotsky.



who came from the villages and brought with them a traditional patriarchal understanding of politics, and who overwhelmed the Old Bolsheviks in the Communist Party by the end of the 1920s. Here Latsis *nolens volens* comes close to Trotsky's argument for the roots of Stalinism in "the domination of the petty bourgeoisie in the population as a whole, joining the working class and Party."<sup>17</sup>

## The Limits of the Stalin Debate

With rare exceptions, the focus of Soviet commentators in the debates over Stalin has been on personalities and ideas. This is equally true for the determinist Tsipko and the alternativist Latsis. As a result, "intentionalist" explanatory schemas that focus on the conscious intentions of the Stalinist leadership have for the moment triumphed over any "structuralist" arguments that would seek the roots of these phenomena in the structure of decision-making processes, the political economy, or the political culture.<sup>18</sup> Most writings betray a preference for an uncritical use of the term totalitarian to describe the Soviet political economy (often dated virtually from the 1917 Revolution), as well as the implicit and explicit teleological tone that has usually accompanied writings by the adherents of the totalitarian school outside the Soviet Union.<sup>19</sup> Especially "radical" Soviet historians and publicists have traced a program of totalitarian rule to Lenin's and Stalin's earliest writings and described Soviet history as the gradual realization of their despotic aims.<sup>20</sup>

The clearest example of how overattention to matters of personality leaves the fundamental questions of Russian history unanswered is Dmitry Volkogonov's two-volume biography of Stalin, *Triumph and Tragedy*.<sup>21</sup> Volkogonov, who had access to a stunning range of previously classified archives and to the testimony of Stalin's co-workers and deputies, belongs—or at least belonged at the time of writing—rather unenthusiastically to the alterna-

tivist school; but his eclectic musings on the sources of Stalinism, or "Caesarism" as he calls it, are unsatisfying. In fairness to Volkogonov, he readily admits to not having written a definitive history of the Stalin period, but rather preliminary sketches for a biographical portrait. But, as nearly all Stalin biographers have done in the past, so too Volkogonov constantly falls victim to the seduction of generalizing about Soviet society from his central narrative about Stalin and his immediate entourage. And, in a practice long sanctioned by Soviet historians of the Party, Volkogonov and many of his colleagues continue to assume that signed decrees were forthrightly and unquestioningly implemented as policy down to the basic units of Soviet administration and society. Historians who share this assumption of the leadership's omnipotence and omniscience never think to raise issues of institutional, social, or cultural resistance and, consequently, Stalin's personality cult continues to hold them firmly in its grip, only now in its mirror version.

The current preoccupation with "intentionalist" approaches can be partly understood as the reaction to an official political history that had long been falsified. Much of the energies of serious historians now goes toward reconstructing the basic outlines of political struggles from long-denied Party and state archives. Furthermore, historians at this stage simply can not draw on a body of solid social, economic, and institutional history that, for example, the historians of Germany have available for their greatly more sophisticated debates about the nature of National Socialism. Despite the venerable Soviet tradition of multivolume histories of the peasantry, the working class, and intelligentsia, in fact the type of social history that Soviet historians have written to date bears little resemblance to what we outside the Soviet Union usually mean by that term. Instead, these tomes are compilations of decrees and "supporting" statistics that not only leave the politics out, but also fail to convey much sense

- 17 Even closer to Trotsky's theses are the writings of D. Dzarasov, who traces Stalinism to the rise of a social class or group alien to socialism after Lenin's death, namely, the triumph of bureaucratism over democracy. See his "Raboty nepochatyi kraj," *Moskovskaya pravda* (January 31, 1988); and "Partynaya demokratiya i byurokratiya: k istokam problemy," in *Inogo ne damo*, ed. Yu. N. Afanasyev (Moscow: Progress, 1988), pp. 324-42.
- 18 I use these terms roughly in the sense that Tim Mason does in "Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," in *Der Fuehrerstaat: Mythos und Realitaet*, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 23-40; and Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship*.
- 19 On the dangers of "Whig" history in Western schools of interpretation in Soviet studies, see Stephen Cohen, "Sovietology as a Vocation," in his *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
- 20 See the volume of conference proceedings devoted to the totalitarian model, *Totalitarizm kak istorichesky fenomen* (Moscow, 1989). In his posthumously published novel about World War II, *Life and Fate* (*Zhizn' i sud'ba*), Vasily Grossman directly compares Stalin and Hitler, suggesting that they were variants of the same political syndrome.
- 21 *Triumf i tragediya. I. V. Stalin: politichesky portret*, 2 vols. in 4 parts (Moscow: APN, 1989).



of the very social groups whose histories they purport to be chronicling.

Beyond constraints imposed by the absence of a solid base of social history for the Soviet period, the intellectual resistance among contemporary historians to explore structuralist explanations might in part be explained by reasons similar to those for the persistent resistance among German historians to part with more narrowly intentionalist approaches. The structuralist approach, after all, "extends the responsibility and culpability to groups and agencies in the Nazi State beyond the Fuehrer himself."<sup>22</sup> Similarly, a focus on Stalin's intentions not only implicitly privileges historical explanations based on intuited understanding of motives and intentions of leading actors in the drama and thereby ignores large issues of fundamental social, economic, and political change, but also, as Kershaw reminds us in the case of German history, "whatever moral warning might be drawn from a study" of Stalinism is "limited in its application."<sup>23</sup> The intentionalist approach in Soviet history, moreover, is additionally crippled in advance by the relatively narrow source base (especially when compared to the richness of the German sources, such as the diaries of leading political, military and economic leaders), which leaves the Soviet historian far more space where speculation must inevitably supplant real, hard data.<sup>24</sup>

Given the understandable reluctance to engage these painful moral issues, it is revealing that none of the historians who work on the post-1917 period have taken advantage of the excellent work done by Soviet and several non-Soviet historians of the pre-revolutionary period who have clearly taken a more structuralist and holistic approach. These histori-

ans, in attempting to explain why the 1917 Revolutions occurred when and how they did (and implicitly their consequences), have written about "the crisis of the autocracy" in the political, economic, social, and ideological realms.<sup>25</sup> After all, the Revolutions of 1917 addressed only the crisis in the political elites, if even that; the major social, economic, ethnic, and cultural dilemmas often assumed new forms, but certainly did not disappear. And it was these realities with which political actors at the top of the successor Soviet state and their diverse ideas had to contend.<sup>26</sup>

That the Soviet historical establishment, even in its "glasnost" reconfiguration, remained relatively united in fierce resistance to structuralist explanations is clear from the response to the occasional historian who pointed out "objective" socioeconomic or political contradictions in the 1920s that underlay the ideological debates and power struggles at the top.<sup>27</sup> Admittedly, their critics correctly chastized the would-be structuralists for a tendency to economic schematicism or overly deterministic formulae, but the attacks have gone beyond intellectual arguments to impute the moral character of the revisionist authors.<sup>28</sup> To date any attempts to so "historicize"<sup>29</sup> the Stalin period become quickly embroiled in the attempts to allocate guilt for the crimes committed during and before Stalin's ascent to power. Moral sensitivities have been so acute because ardent, genuine defenders of Stalin continue to make their case in popular journals and other forums; the emotional environment is therefore highly charged and dispassionate analysis of the origins of Stalinism raises fears that the researchers want to rehabilitate the Communist despot.<sup>30</sup> None of the younger revisionists looks to whitewash Stalin or his henchmen nor to diminish

22 Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship*, p. 88.

23 Ibid., p. 69.

24 Not only is Volkogonov's biography illustrative of these dangers, but also see Robert Tucker's two-volume (to date) biography of Stalin, *Stalin as Revolutionary* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973) and *Stalin in Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).

25 For a recent formulation of the thesis of a prerevolutionary crisis, see the collective work, *Krizis samoderzhaviya v Rossii, 1895-1917* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984); see also the work of the Columbia University historian Leopold Haimson and his students.

26 I cursorily outline some aspects of the possible continuities from the multifaceted "crisis of the autocracy" to the "crisis" of the post-tsarist order in "The NEP, Perestroika, and the Problem of Alternatives," in *Socialism, Perestroika, and the Dilemmas of Soviet Economic Reform*, ed. John Tedstrom (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), esp. pp. 7-11. For a similar structural argument about the origins of Stalinism, see Walter Süss, *Die Arbeiterklasse als Maschine. Ein industriesoziologischer Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte des aufkommenden Stalinismus* (Berlin, 1985). I thank Rosalinde Sartori for this reference.

27 See G. Bordyugov and V. Kozlov, *Voprosy istorii KPSS* 8 (1988): 15-23; V. A. Kozlov and O. V. Khlevnyuk, *Nachinayetsya s cheloveka* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988); L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, *Chto eto bylo?* (Moscow, 1989); and especially M. Gorinov, "Al'ternativy i krizisy v period NEPa," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* 1 (1990): 3-18.

28 See, for example, the critical response to Gorinov's theses by G. A. Trukan, "Vnutripartiyne raznoglasiya kontsa 20-kh godov: Sovremennyy vzglyad," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* 10 (1989): 152-57.

29 For the concept of historicization in studies of the Nazi period, see Martin Broszat, "Plädoyer fuer eine Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus," *Merkur* 39 (1985): 373-85; Saul Friedländer, "Some Reflections on the Historization of National Socialism," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fuer deutsche Geschichte* 16 (1987): 310-24.

30 This is less surprising, perhaps, in the context of the passions aroused during the *Historikerstreit* in Germany, whose current generations are much farther removed from the controversial period and which had undergone a process of de-Nazification. See Kershaw, chapter 9.



their criminality, but this is precisely what their critics suspect them of doing. Rather, the revisionists are trying to solve the riddle of the widespread involvement of large segments of the Soviet population in Stalin's campaigns, including his most murderous ones; but, importantly, they are also attempting to define the limits of Stalin's power vis-à-vis the bureaucratic structures, larger social and demographic processes, and the international and domestic environments. Vladimir Zhuravlyov, a Party historian at the former Institute of Marxism-Leninism, further warned that excessive attention to Stalin's paranoia or schizophrenia at the expense of broader social, economic, and political processes, "the priority of the subjective principle" as he summarizes it, "inevitably leads to the idea of historical pessimism, when everything in socialism—in its past, present and future fates—depends on the personal qualities of the leader." He reminds even those who ardently combat the Stalinist phenomenon that "without understanding the reasons for the consolidation of the personality cult, we will not be able to work out a social mechanism that can guarantee society will be free from its repetition."<sup>31</sup>

Two sober voices emerged to call the participants in the Stalin discussion to a measure of reason: the senior historian Mikhail Gelfer and, through his posthumously published memoirs, the late Soviet writer of wartime fiction Konstantin Simonov. Both men lived through a considerable part of the Stalin period and readily acknowledge that they too had once been in the thrall of Stalin's charisma; Simonov even received a Stalin prize for his wartime novels. But both broke decisively with the Stalin cult in their mature years and during the Khrushchev "thaw" began to explore ways to emancipate themselves and their fellow citizens from the fetters of the Stalinist *mentalité*. As a consequence, both fell into official disfavor during the Brezhnev-era partial rehabilitation of Stalin, Gelfer expelled from the Party and the History Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Simonov forbidden to

publish his memoirs and interviews with wartime commanders and heavily censored when published at all. Gelfer, in his several essays published in liberal and reformist journals,<sup>32</sup> and Simonov, in the posthumous collection of interviews with Stalin's generals and his own reminiscences of the Stalin years,<sup>33</sup> have offered rare voices of tolerance, self-criticism, dignity, and a welcome patriotic humility.<sup>34</sup>

## Two Political-Historical Controversies

Simonov's posthumous writings in particular have been at the center of a highly emotional struggle—that is also very illustrative for the many other substantial historical controversies underway<sup>35</sup>—over the legacy of the Great Fatherland War and Stalin's responsibility (or guilt) for the state of unpreparedness of the Soviet Army in the initial months following the German invasion. The debate is referred to in the media as "the cost of victory." The victory in World War II, portrayed in official historiography as an unmitigatingly heroic struggle waged by a talented military leadership, has allowed the armed forces to preserve a legitimate place in the Soviet system of values that orthodox historians have portrayed as largely autonomous from and untainted by the leftist politics of the revolution and Communist Party, as well as the murderous history of the security organs (especially since the army itself also suffered so heavily at the hands of the NKVD). During the Khrushchev "thaw," Aleksandr Nekrich, the Boston-based expatriate Soviet historian, placed the blame for the unpreparedness squarely on Stalin, but he was quickly drummed out of the historical establishment shortly after Khrushchev's ouster from power when the conservative forces reconsolidated their hold over the social sciences.<sup>36</sup> In the aftermath of the counterassault by Stalin's defend-

31 V. V. Zhuravlyov, in a round-table discussion about the 1930s, *30-e gody: vzglyad iz segodnya*, ed. D. Volkogonov (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), pp. 10-11.

32 See, among others, "Ot anti-Stalina k ne-Stalinu: neproydennyi put'" and "Stalin umer vchera...," reprinted in M. Ya. Gelfer, *Iz tekh i etikh let* (Moscow: Progress, 1991).

33 Konstantin Simonov, *Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniya: razmyshleniya o I. V. Staline* (Moscow: Pravda, 1990).

34 Other commentators have also called for less categorical approaches to the Stalin period. See, for example, G. Kh. Popov and N. Adzhubey, "Pamyat' i Pamyat'," *Znaniya* 1 (1988): 188-203, esp. pp. 190, 201. Popov reminds his readers that "in the culture of every people there are progressive and conservative elements. Both must be seen, both must be considered in their specific historical context. What was a clear weakness in one case begins to play a positive role in another situation. To suppress memory, to cut it up, to take only one part of it, means in fact to deprive oneself of all memory."

35 I have chosen to highlight this debate about the war and the one following about nationality history because neither debate has received as much attention in the general English-language surveys of the Soviet *Historikerstreit* as have others about the terror, collectivization, and the NEP alternative to Stalinism.



ers, leading Soviet marshals and generals rewrote their memoirs to accommodate the more favorable view of the Generalissimo.<sup>37</sup>

The new debate has reopened all the questions raised by Nekrich, but also went much further in evaluating the impact of Stalinist values on the nation's fate. What the Army leadership, especially its Main Political Administration, viewed as its legitimate place in Soviet values came under fierce assault by mostly civilian historians operating on the fringe of the professional historical establishment. The harshest critics indicted the entire Bolshevik-Soviet leadership for the miserable performance in World War II and viewed the wartime tragedies as only the culmination of a system fundamentally wrong from its inception in October 1917.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, the military purges are not viewed as a significant departure from the *modus operandi* of the Bolshevik leadership; rather, they are merely one more manifestation of the inhumane attitudes that prevailed among those leaders.

In response to the attack on the values of the military-industrial complex, high-ranking soldiers produced new data to defend their claims that, despite the ravages of the purges in the army and despite the constant political meddling of the party leadership in military affairs, the armed forces performed not only heroically but with considerable native military talent and with largely national material resources.<sup>39</sup> The orthodox publicists and historians now argue for a "balanced" view of Stalin's role in the war. In practice this often means downplaying the disastrous opening months of the war and the catastrophes in 1942 at Kharkov and in the Crimea and instead highlighting the victories at Stalingrad and Berlin, everywhere attributing considerable strategic wisdom to Stalin himself. The purges also are passed over lightly, one suspects, because the military men who have defended the

orthodox version often owed their career advances to the terror of the 1930s.

Standing somewhere in between the orthodox defenders and "radical" critics of the Soviet system of values have been those scholars who adhere to a third position, namely, that an anti-Stalin Leninist tradition existed in the Army similar to the anti-Stalin alternatives in the Party and economy. The arguments of these authors, many of them once associated with the embattled Institute of Military History, resembled those of other Soviet historians writing and speaking about other aspects of the postrevolutionary past, namely, a school that upheld "alternatives to the Stalin system." For military historians who adhered to the "alternative" thesis, the key figures are the executed Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Yakir, Blyukher, and Garmik; but also the earlier deceased Frunze, some military specialists, and, in some cases, Trotsky. For these historians, the Stalinist clique of Voroshilov, Budyenny, Mekhlis, and others is viewed as a false tradition or as a rupture in Soviet military tradition, and one to be decisively extirpated. They, in contrast to the preceding two groups, have focused considerable attention on the purges and the system of terror in general as the major cause of the disastrous performance during the first months of the war. The "alternativists" thereby do not throw out the whole Soviet past, but they argue that a more genuine socialist non-Stalinist path of development was cut off or diverted by "betrayers of the Revolution."<sup>40</sup>

Closely related to the controversies surrounding the military history of World War II has been a critical reevaluation of prewar Soviet foreign policy, especially the Soviet-German nonaggression pact and its secret clauses. Here too a few very outspoken critics, notably Vyacheslav Dashichev and Mikhail Semiryaga, denounced the pact as morally heinous and politically wrong.<sup>41</sup> Both

36 A. M. Nekrich, *22 iyunya 1941* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965); for the critical review that set the tone for all later comments, see G. A. Deborin and Major-General B. S. Tel'pukhovskiy, "V ideynom plenu u fal'sifikatorov istorii," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* 9 (1967): 127-40.

37 See Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin and His Generals. Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), esp. pp. 15-44.

38 The most radical revisionist account to date is that of Boris Sokolov, *Tsena pobedy. Velikaya otechestvennaya: neizvestnoye ob izvestnom* (Moscow: Moskovsky rabochy, 1990). See also the "conversation" of historian Gennady Bordyugov and journalist Aleksandr Afanasyev, "Ukradennaya pobeda," in *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (May 5, 1990), pp. 1-2; and the harsh reactions of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet war veterans, *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (August 31, 1990), p. 2. I thank Markus Wehner for this reference.

39 For surveys of the debates over military history in particular, see the excellent accounts by Hans-Henning Schroeder, "Die Lehren von 1941. Die Diskussion um die Neubewertung des 'Grossen Vaterlaendischen Krieges' in der Sowjetunion," in *Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Analysen, Grundzuege, Forschungsbilanzen*, ed. Wolfgang Michalka (Munich: Piper, 1989), pp. 608-25; and his "Weisse Flecken in der Geschichte der Roten Armee," *Osteuropa* 5 (1989): 459-77; and Bernd Bonwetsch, "Georgij Konstantinowitsch Shukow—Heerfuhrer und Memoirenverfasser," *Osteuropa Archiv* (1988): A327-36.

40 This is the central argument of Dmitry Volkogonov's two-volume biography of Stalin, *Triumf i tragediya*; and also the thesis of Anatoly Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat and 39-yi i drugiye gody* ('39 and Other Years).

41 For Dashichev's position, see his "Vostok—zapad: Poisk novykh otnosheniy. O prioretetakh vneshney politiki Sovetskogo gosudarstva," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (May 18, 1988), p. 14; for Semiryaga's, see "23 avgusta 1939 goda. Sovetsko-germanskyy dogovor o nenapadenii: byla li



Dashichev and Semiryaga earlier tied their critique of the Stalin-Molotov foreign policy to an appeal for Gorbachev's "common European home" orientation under Shevardnadze, that is, an orientation toward the West European democracies and against continued ties to Third World military dictatorships. They too were publicly attacked by more "establishment" diplomatic and military historians who defended the pact with the traditional argument: after Soviet overtures to the Western governments went unheeded, Stalin had no choice but to try to delay the inevitable German invasion. Conservative nationalists resisted Gorbachev's rhetoric of "a common European home," viewing Shevardnadze's foreign policy as capitulationist and deleterious to Soviet national interests.<sup>42</sup>

Dashichev's and Semiryaga's revisions of Soviet diplomatic history have been further tied to one of the most volatile discussions of "the crimes of the past": the history of interethnic relations in the Soviet and, occasionally, in the Imperial periods. Because most non-Russian nations have historically populated the peripheries of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union, their pasts have been inextricably linked with diplomatic and military history. The attacks on the Soviet-German agreements of 1939 most immediately touched upon the fates of the Baltic republics, Moldavia, and Western Ukraine and Byelorussia, but they also occasioned acrimonious disputes between Polish and Soviet historians—and among Soviet historians as well—over the Katyn Forest massacres. Indeed, one of the most painful legacies of Stalinist politics has been the issue of nationalities and national history in the Soviet multiethnic state.

During the 1920s and early 1930s, Soviet historians wrote very critically about the colonial and foreign policies of tsarist Russia, frequently justifying their researches with the antitsarist attitudes of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Their critical attitude toward Russian imperialism and their assertion of a radical discontinuity with the post-1917 period went hand in hand with a conscious effort to combat Great Russian chauvinism and chauvinistic nationalism in general and to promote "proletarian internationalism." Beginning in the second

half of the 1920s, however, certain Marxist scholars (often associated with Mikhail Pokrovsky) attacked what was called "national communism" (Sultan-Galievism in the area of pan-Turkism and pan-Islam) and "bourgeois nationalism" (the Hrushevsky school in Ukrainian history). Although the Pokrovsky school did not intend it, the balance began to shift back in the direction of a privileged position for Great Russian interests. By the mid-1930s, after the Pokrovsky school had been crushed, the victors—now very consciously—resurrected the history of the Great Russian state. All histories of non-Russian nations were subordinated to the history of the Great Russian people; non-Russians could not read textbooks devoted to their national histories until 1960. Even then, the dominant organizing principle of Soviet history was the "friendship of peoples," so that all friendly historical ties between Russians and non-Russians were highlighted and all hostile ties or ties between non-Russians and non-Soviet peoples were downplayed, ignored, or distorted in historical treatments.<sup>43</sup> Historians' reevaluation of Russian/non-Russian relations paralleled a change in their attitudes toward Russian colonialism that in effect reestablished continuity with Soviet foreign policy as a progressive and liberationist phenomenon. Not surprisingly, until recently Marx's and Engels' critical articles were not published or mentioned.<sup>44</sup>

Once the histories of all non-Russian peoples were so coordinated with the history of the Russian people, these histories were also rewritten to conform with a general scheme of periodization and especially parallel stages of class formation and struggle. Because the most populous non-Russian nations have always been located on the peripheries of the empire, of course, their ties with non-Russian and non-Soviet co-religionists or co-ethnics have been important; but here too these ties have been ignored or distorted in Soviet historical science and usually discussed under the rubric of "struggle against bourgeois falsification." Any researcher who suggested that Russian, and by extension Soviet, nationality policy had negative aspects could be and often was pilloried for "nationalist deviations." Especially, any discussion of anti-Rus-

al'ternativa?" *Literaturnaya gazeta* (October 5, 1988), p. 14.

42 This certainly is the major political line in such conservative journals as *Voenna-istorichesky zhurnal*, *Nash sovremennik*, and *Molodaya gvardiya*.  
43 See the fascinating study of the concept of "friendship of peoples" in Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

44 Only in 1989 was Marx's highly critical account of tsarist foreign policy published in the Soviet Union. See Karl Marks, "Razoblacheniya diplomaticheskoy istorii XVIII veka," *Voprosy istorii* 1 (1989): 3-23; 2: 3-16; 4: 3-19. Also Engels' "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism."



sian revolts was viewed as fomenting interethnic hostility and thereby injuring the Soviet state. The cult of the Russian centralized state that dated from the 1930s also set the parameters for any discussion of alternate forms of federal organization for the multiethnic empire/state. All mention of earlier appeals for greater sovereignty and autonomy for non-Russian peoples brought down the harsh hand of the censor and accusations that the author was a bourgeois secessionist and, at one period, an agent of British or other foreign imperialisms.

In answer to the Stalin-era revisionism of the history of interethnic relations (and its further elaboration under Stalin's successors), a dissident canon emerged from *tamizdat*, *samizdat*, and émigré histories of the non-Russian peoples. That canon, in sharp contrast to the official Soviet narrative, focused almost exclusively on anti-Russian social movements and anti-centralist intellectual trends.<sup>45</sup> Today, with the ascent of anti-Moscow popular fronts in many non-Russian republics and their secession and transition to sovereign statehood, these alternative narratives have won "official" status. The more anti-Russian and anti-Soviet the version is, the greater chance it has of winning popularity. Contemporary "democrats" and "nationalists" have mobilized these long suppressed narratives, often heavily imbued with great doses of national messianic mythmaking and blatantly chauvinistic utopianism, in their struggles with the central authorities and their representatives in the peripheries.<sup>46</sup> For their part, central authorities frequently appeared as defenders of ethnic minorities in the republics and thereby justified their interventions. Everywhere historians and would-be historians are mobilized to articulate national interests for competing state and incipient state structures. Here too, because of the moral-psychological climate and alignment of political forces, an even-handed version of the Russian and Soviet pasts is

proving as difficult to fashion as a new federal relationship for the former Soviet republics.

On the Russian side of the struggle, the heavy hand of Zhdanov-era national chauvinism and xenophobia still makes itself felt in the often defensive attitudes of leading writers, publicists, and historians toward any suggestion of the Russian majority's ill-treatment of non-Russian peoples or of significant foreign influences on and ties to Russian or Soviet culture. The labels of cosmopolitan, Freemason, Zionist, and especially Russophobe, are poisoning many important discussions of the relationship of Russian and Soviet history to broader trends in European and world history. A further unpleasant note in these debates is to identify non-Russians, most often Jews, as the source of what are viewed as major national catastrophes; notable has been the attention to Yakov Sverdlov, the Communist Party's first general secretary, and the persistent resistance to the full historical and political rehabilitation of Lev Trotsky.<sup>47</sup>

Regardless of the particular aspect of the "Stalin debate" that is surveyed, the historians' struggles have remained mired in the moral and political conflicts that affect all institutions and social and ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union. Despite the formal lifting of nearly all previous taboos and despite increased access to archives and other sources, it is not a propitious time for a historian of the Soviet period in any of the successor states to the Soviet Union. The non-Soviet historian can only look on with patience and, following the noble example of Konstantin Simonov, a good dose of national humility,<sup>48</sup> chastened by the experience of the historians of twentieth-century Germany or even of revolutionary France. After all, in the case of the last issue, namely, the history of interethnic relations in the Russian Empire/Soviet Union, American historians have only recently begun to revise the Anglo-Saxon myth of their own country

45 By way of examples, for the history of Turkic and Muslim peoples, see the school of Alexandre Bennigsen (Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, S. Enders Wimbush, Chantal Quelquejey); for Ukraine and Byelorussia, see works by Hrihory Kostyuk, Yaroslav Bilinsky, Nicholas Vakar, Jurij Borys, Taras Hunczak, Basil Dmytryshyn, and Ivan Rudnytsky. The legacy of Michael Hrushevsky for Ukrainian history has been recovered. Among the most anti-Soviet texts treating the nationality problems have been Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* (New York, 1970); and Aleksandr Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*.

46 A good example of these trends is the transformation of historical consciousness in Ukraine. See, among others, Frank Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," *Social Research* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991); Bohdan Krawchenko, "National Memory in Ukraine: The Role of the Blue and Yellow Flag," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 1-22.

47 For a recent review of the struggle over Trotsky's rehabilitation in historical literature, see Markus Wehner, "Rueckkehr mit Hindernissen: Die 'gebremste' Diskussion um L. D. Trozki in der Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa* 3 (1991): 247-58; also Thomas Sherlock, "Politics and History under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* (May-August 1988): 16-42.

48 Unfortunately, several leading Cold War historians, following the lead of Richard Pipes and Robert Conquest, are expressing a measure of *Schadenfreude* at the collapse of Soviet institutions and orthodox historical schemas and are joining in the Anglo-American (and perhaps German as well) rush to triumphalist self-congratulation.



and to integrate the histories of non-European peoples into the national chronicle.<sup>49</sup> The non-Soviet historical community, despite not inconsiderable achievements to its credit, has long been crippled by the absence of a genuine partner in dialogue and debate inside the Soviet Union. And in some desirably not-too-distant future, historians in the successor states might be able to return quietly to their national and local archives with a new intellectual agenda that will be the fruit of their own painful reevaluations of their nations' pasts.

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<sup>49</sup> See, for example, the Preface to the third edition of a "revisionist" American history textbook, *A People and a Nation: The History of the United States*, ed. Mary Beth Norton, et al., 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990).



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